Muscat, the Negotiation of Coercion,So Does Tehran Need War?

Samir al-Taqi,

On the canvas of the Muscat negotiations, the regional drama appears in all its dimensions!

Formally, we observe positive signals, yet they implicitly conceal deep disagreements. For Tehran does not know what Trump will accept: a narrow temporary agreement, or whether he is inevitably moving toward “settling the situation in its entirety.”Not to mention the اختلاف over the pattern of the solution and its dimensions, the window of diplomacy between America and Iran opened with an empty agenda.While both sides display a desire to continue the “talks,” each attempts to draw their boundaries.

Araghchi describes the first session as “positive” and “a good beginning,” yet he hastens to establish a governing constraint: “The subject of our talks is purely nuclear.” In contrast, reports indicate that Washington has not softened its insistence on the scope of the talks: missiles, proxies, and human rights files.In the face of this contradiction, the Muscat talks do not constitute “arms limitation” negotiations so much as they are crisis management by negotiated means under pressure: talks to avoid an explosion now, and coercion and escalation to compel the other party to pay a price later.

Thus, a less romantic question takes shape: what deal is possible in an environment of acute mistrust, where every storm is feared to turn any concession today into a card of no value tomorrow?Even in coercive negotiation, the first circle revolves around defining the problem. Tehran wants to confine it to the nuclear file,while Washington wants to resolve the Iranian dilemma once and for all, driven by its alliances and the desired strategic deterrence.Indeed, Washington sees the nuclear file as a foregone conclusion, a base for moving toward other issues, while Tehran finds it the ultimate end.According to Araghchi, Tehran elevates the enrichment decision from a mere technical issue to a sovereign symbol. But Washington does not argue from the logic of rights; rather from the logic of economic coercion or even military coercion.According to “The National,” Washington is brandishing new sanctions mechanisms—25%—on imports of countries that purchase Iranian goods “directly or indirectly,” so as to affect other parties dealing with Iran.This approach carries a simple logic: reducing the margins of maneuver available to Iran and greatly increasing the cost of Iran’s playing for time.For its part, despite Iran’s coexistence with sanctions, it is apprehensive about their continuation even if Iran makes concessions. In that case, Tehran may prefer a short-term deal, or it may prolong the negotiation, allowing it to buy time and manage costs.Here emerges the most complex dilemma in these negotiations! For even if agreement can be reached on the agenda, and on margins for overt or covert bargaining, the dilemma remains in the weakness of future guarantees.In these negotiations, the sequencing of bargains and their interlinkage become more important than negotiating “principles”: what issue is discussed first? And how can one retreat midway through the negotiations from what was previously agreed upon?

One may imagine that agreement could be reached on “limits in exchange for relief”: clear ceilings for the nuclear program and uranium stockpile, expansion of monitoring and verification, in exchange for partial and specific sanctions relief designed so that it can be quickly reversed if compliance collapses. In this sense, such a deal would not be able to end the conflict, but it would manage its risks.

But beyond the techniques of negotiation, it is clear that both sides are not negotiating with each other alone; rather, they are negotiating with their own publics.The American domestic arena imposes a short and rapid rhythm: a desire for a “visible achievement that saves Trump’s face.” The Iranian arena imposes a sovereign discourse on “enrichment” and “steadfastness” in the face of pressure, and sensitivity toward any concession that may appear gratuitous.

More importantly, the two sides collude in an exposed disregard to conceal that “taboo which no one wishes to touch.” Namely, that Israel is an organic part of these negotiations.Israel’s interest lies either in a complete settlement of Iran’s regional risks—from nuclear to missiles to arms—or in an agreement that calms the arena but does not ease the pressure and keeps the finger on the trigger.

It is a historic opportunity for Israel to change the strategic context of the regional conflict. For the stars have aligned in its favor as never before, such that all international powers have given it a free hand to complete the structural liquidation of the “Axis of Resistance.” Therefore, it insists on completing the closure of direct Iranian strategic risks. Otherwise, its historic opportunity diminishes, and all its achievements after the seventh of October become merely the closing of one cycle of conflict, in preparation for an imminent cycle!Araghchi says that “our atomic bomb is the power that says no to the great powers.” This type of signaling may improve the regime’s domestic reputation, but it greatly increases American reservation and Israeli determination, and opens the possibility that maritime incidents or proxy activity could turn into a spark igniting an unrestrained conflict.From the point of view of the technocrats surrounding President Pezeshkian, they suffer from the rigidity of the ideological structure of the state and its great limitation in its ability to adapt, especially in light of the new round of American sanctions, while the political system deepens coercive control over the economy and society.These factors carry the features of enormous latent fragility: internal Iranian hardening that raises the cost of error, increases information distortion, and makes retreat more difficult.Conversely, Trump knows the cost of appearing deceived before his public! Not because he raised the negotiating ceiling, but because any current agreement will inevitably be compared with Obama’s 2015 agreement.At that point, he will have to confront his critics not only in Israel, but across the spectrum extending from Democrats who will compare any agreement to Obama’s agreement, to significant Republican currents who see in a partial nuclear agreement a concession that leaves missiles and proxies outside constraint. Then, opponents together will seek to obstruct it politically or in the field.As Netanyahu declares that Israel must become militarily independent of America within five years, and as his security officials declare that any agreement that does not take Israel’s interests into account “has no value,” Trump may expect what he will hear from Netanyahu in his upcoming visit to Washington: Israel will not be bound to de-escalation with Iran in the region unless its demands are met! And as Israel possesses many cards on the ground, it may deprive Trump of reaping the gains of “peace agreements” Americanly and regionally.International financial circles estimate the probabilities of confrontation and escalation at 75% in the absence of mechanisms to guarantee permanent commitment, so that the conflict returns to its cycle anew: de-escalation and then tension, with sudden shocks—financial, political, or military—that reshuffle the cards.

Therefore, after 25 years of negotiation, the cards have become exposed and the path clear.The question then becomes: does Tehran need war? Article link https://www.annahar.com/articles/annahar-writers/276840/مسقط-مفاوضة-الإكراه-فهل-تحتاج-طهران-للحرب