The Middle East: Warring Tribes and Opaque American Maps

In the ongoing debate over how far the modern nation‑state concept applies to Middle Eastern states in U.S. strategy, statements by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack have highlighted how Washington’s decision‑making circles view the region’s existing political entities: they read the geography of the Middle East primarily through tribal, communal, and religious anchors rather than through the principles of the modern state.

In this vein, Barrack said in a press interview: “There is no Middle East, but rather tribes and villages,” noting that the region’s nation‑states were created by the British and the French in 1916 through the Sykes–Picot Agreement. He continued: “The nation‑states in the Middle East were established by the British and the French... and as Sykes–Picot put it: we will take what is known as the Ottoman Empire, draw straight lines around it, and call them nation‑states. But the Middle East does not work like that: it begins with the individual, then the family, then the village, then the tribe, then society and religion, eventually forming the notion of the state.” He added: “The belief that twenty‑seven different states in the region, comprising 110 ethnic groups, can be unified behind a single political stance is a mere illusion.”

From this, the U.S. approach to the Middle East and its issues appears deeply opaque. Washington engages the region on the basis of objectives tied to confronting its strategic rivals—China and Russia—through transactional logic and immediate interests. Thus, U.S. policy in the Middle East—especially under President Trump—reveals clear preferences: energy security, Israel’s qualitative edge, counter‑terrorism, the protection of strategic waterways, and curbing the Iranian threat. Analysts argue this lens leads Washington to treat Middle Eastern geography as a space subject to redesign according to its own calculations—whether via flexible alliance projects or by rearranging borders and economic‑security functions. In this sense, the U.S. position tends toward a pragmatic economic‑security blend that recognizes only “functional stability,” allowing for managed influence and power balances. 31

Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, told “+963” that the views voiced by Ambassador Barrack do not reflect President Trump’s positions; they are his own. On that basis, he stressed, no firm inferences can be drawn about U.S. Middle East policy, since Barrack implements the president’s deal‑driven approach, which shifts continually according to opportunities Trump identifies. The U.S. government, he added, lacks a unified or consistent regional strategy; policy is transactional and changeable at any time. Haykel concludes that President Trump treats each state separately and does not possess a collective regional vision, even if he recognizes that allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia have one. What he does share with Riyadh and Ankara is a desire for a prosperous, stable region that benefits U.S. interests—especially commercial and military.

For his part, Samir al‑Taqi, a researcher at the Washington Institute, argues that U.S. diplomacy is passing through a transitional moment marked by internal contention over alliance architecture in the region. The issue, he says, is not confined to the Middle East but is tied to America’s place in the world. Washington increasingly declares itself not absolutely responsible for global security, opting instead to exercise power and pursue selective interests where and to the extent its calculations require. In comments to “+963,” al‑Taqi says the ideal U.S. aim is a regional alliance that balances Russia and China—a “Middle East NATO”—though that path is presently beset by confusion. “We are awaiting major developments in the coming days,” he adds, “chief among them the president’s decision on Gaza and on empowering a central Arab role in recovery efforts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and even Iraq.” Elsewhere, al‑Taqi notes that Prime Minister Netanyahu has long held U.S. policy hostage and that Washington has, in turn, become captive to that influence, eroding its strategic initiative. Evidence of this retreat, he says, is visible at the United Nations, in hesitancy over recognizing a Palestinian state, and in waning interest in a two‑state solution. For the first time since 1956, Europe is advancing an initiative independently of Washington’s core policy—a sign that the United States is seeking exits to avoid direct confrontation. U.S. policy, he continues, remains bound to Netanyahu’s positions—particularly regarding Barrack’s remarks, remapping the region, and energy corridors. Barrack’s vision is “far‑right,” recasting the Middle East as sectarian entities and labeling some states “failed,” to be redrawn—potentially reopening the Syrian–Lebanese border question, the future of Tripoli, and even partitioning Iraq. In this transitional phase, al‑Taqi argues, Washington cannot deliver the sweeping transformations it touts; lacking initiative, it cannot impose new maps or a different Middle East. It may even imagine an Arab–Israeli alignment not necessarily aimed at Iran, which, he says, has become less dangerous than before—even if it retains the capacity to project power from within its own territory. Most Arab and Gulf states, he notes, have now reached strategic accommodations with Tehran and agreed on several issues after the ebbing of some of Iran’s proxies. Tehran itself has shifted from backing proxies to building internal deterrence. Hence Washington is reorganizing its cards around inter‑state alliances; any attempt to reengineer state structures would likely fail—and deepen the failure of U.S. policy if pursued. Pressing Lebanon to the brink risks partition—something Washington could not contain—and the same applies to Syria. Giving Israeli settlers a “blank check” to implement their vision of the state and engineer radical demographic and political changes, coupled with Barrack’s proposals, could ultimately produce a broad failure of U.S. policy in the region.

Former Iraqi intelligence official Salem al‑Jumaili told “+963” that U.S. Middle East policy reflects the dominance of business interests over decision‑making circles, mapping policy primarily through an economic‑investment lens. The United States does not treat the Middle East as a coherent geographic unit but as a vital field defined by immediate interests: energy security, Israel’s protection, counter‑terrorism, and safeguarding strategic waterways. For that reason, some U.S. envoys avoid the term “Middle East” as a single concept, preferring to handle it as a series of separate files. Barrack’s speech, he says, clearly signals a current within the American elite that looks at the region’s future through economic and investment gateways within a stable security environment and favors integrating Israel into a new regional architecture.