The Most Dangerous Thing About the Moment Is for “Hamas” to Savor the Opportunity

[Context and Partial Acceptance]Amid mounting Palestinian and Arab pressures, the “Hamas” movement partially accepted Trump’s peace plan, leaving essential elements of the fateful decisions concerning the future of the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict without a decisive answer. It has neither explicitly agreed to the plan’s clauses, nor authorized the Palestinian Authority to negotiate over them, nor declared its commitment to the parameters of the Palestinian struggle as defined by the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

[Decision Vacuum and Netanyahu’s Leverage]In this vacuum, the fate of the Strip and the Palestinian people and the future of the conflict remain hostage to the “mercy” of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will spare no effort to persuade U.S. President Donald Trump of the futility of his plan and to push toward the option of reoccupying the Gaza Strip in full, with the massacres and further tragedies for Palestinians that entails. All of this is carried out under an American and international cover broader than ever before, compared with previous agreements.

[Diplomatic Maneuvers and International Positioning]Trump succeeded in neutralizing internal opposition within the Israeli government and paved the way through a series of regional and international diplomatic moves. He also managed to silence dissenting voices within his administration and even succeeded in winning Russia’s backing, as President Vladimir Putin announced his direct support for the American initiative.

[Softening Israel’s Stance; Bringing In Turkey and Qatar]In a notable development, Trump was able to soften the Israeli position, which had rejected any Arab or Islamic role in the postwar phase, especially in managing the Strip during the recovery stage. He also incorporated both Turkey and Qatar into his plan, offering Turkey strategic inducements, among them additional time to obtain cheap Russian gas and preparing the way for its return to the U.S. F‑35 program.

[Iran’s Posture and Guarantees to Hamas]As for Iran, it refrained from obstructing the plan and settled for a muted skepticism incomparable to its usual tone, while the Trump administration provided security guarantees to the leadership of “Hamas” and its fighters, whether they decided to remain in Gaza or depart it.

[Decisive Days and a Shift in Approach]The days ahead will be decisive in testing the Palestinians’ ability to seize Trump’s opportunity, which carries a relative—albeit limited—adjustment in the U.S. administration’s approach to the crisis in Gaza.

[Sharm el‑Sheikh Talks and Withdrawal Maps]With the anticipated negotiations beginning in Sharm el‑Sheikh, the United States is presenting detailed maps prepared by its security and military experts for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza; it is expected that both Israel and the leadership of “Hamas” will sign them, which will lead to a halt in the bombardment, then an exchange of hostages after the deadline set for Hamas expires.

[U.S. Lead in the Postwar Phase]It is true that Washington’s taking the lead in managing the postwar phase in Gaza constitutes a rare opportunity, but it is by no means an occasion for maneuvering or buying time. Rather, this historic moment offers a chance to restore Palestinian legitimacy represented by the Authority and the PLO, which the international community previously supported through initiatives, most notably the Saudi and French initiatives aiming to recognize the Palestinian state according to the two‑state solution.

[If Hostages Are Released, Rules Change]If matters proceed as hoped and the hostages are released, the rules of the conflict will be radically altered.

[End of Hamas’s Negotiating Role; Transitional Arrangements]In that case, the negotiating role of the “Hamas” movement in Gaza would come to an end, and it would become necessary to hasten the formation of an Arab–international framework to administer the areas from which Israel withdraws. Some 1,500 Palestinian police officers, who received their training in Egypt, are preparing to enter and assume their duties in the first phase of the transition.

[Opening Space for the Gaza Administration Committee; Return of the Authority]This arrangement will open the way for the Palestinian committee tasked with administering the Strip, away from “Hamas,” which enhances the chances of the Palestinian Authority’s return to its negotiating position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

[Israeli Bet on Stumbles; Risks Ahead]Although the Israeli government reluctantly accepted Trump’s plan, it is betting on the possibility of its faltering and perhaps on hardline actions from within “Hamas” to upend the table. Even if the first phase proceeds smoothly, there are serious risks that the plan will stumble so that the powers of the transitional authority are limited to areas not fortified in terms of security, while some armed components retain their military structures—reproducing the condition of geographic and political division in Gaza and turning the authority into a nominal entity whose presence on the ground does not exceed the bare minimum.

[Tony Blair’s Initiative]In this context, Tony Blair’s initiative represents a bold attempt to restructure the system of governance in Gaza and perhaps to reactivate the political track as a whole.

[Structural Challenges; Transitional Experience]But the structural challenges are immense. The man who previously served as the Quartet’s envoy (2007–2015) achieved no noteworthy accomplishments and faced harsh criticism for his bias toward Israel. Nevertheless, his proposal regarding Gaza—given his experience in managing international transitional phases (such as Kosovo and Timor‑Leste)—leaves room for some hope of success, provided that Israeli ambitions for comprehensive security control over the Strip are curbed.

[Requirements of a Transitional Administration]The success of any transitional administration will require tight coordination among several parties: the United States, Israel, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Nations, and the European Union. Any defect or conflict of interests among them will have a disastrous effect that may return matters to square one.

[Foreseeable Obstacles; Game‑Theory Lens]Among the most prominent challenges posed are the Authority’s inability to enforce security, resistance by forces of corruption, weak institutional capacity, and the complexity of coordination. From the perspective of game theory, the transitional authority must re‑engineer the balance of payoffs so that cooperation becomes a more rational option for all parties—Israel, “Hamas,” and the Palestinian Authority—than defection and escalation.

[Guarantees, Conditional Aid, and Signals of Fairness]That requires reliable security guarantees, conditional aid, clear diplomatic costs, in addition to serious signals regarding neutrality and fairness, and broad local Palestinian acceptance.

[Warning to Hamas: Time Is Not a Luxury]In light of the foregoing, it would be a fatal mistake for “Hamas” to believe that it possesses the luxury of time and maneuvering, or that there is an international reversal in its favor, or that it can, as an Islamic jihadi movement, procrastinate and continue fighting without a time ceiling.

[Internal Objections Linked to Iran]There are clear indicators of rising objections by Iran’s supporters within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated with Tehran’s line inside “Hamas,” and some Iran‑linked entities outside the movement may reject Trump’s plan despite their ostensible approval of a ceasefire.

[Not Empty Threats]It does not appear that the U.S. administration is brandishing empty threats; rather, it means what it says. It suffices to recall the Iranian experience, when Tehran thought it could continue the negotiation game it so loves over its nuclear file, only to find itself facing a losing strategy against Washington and Tel Aviv.