For the Arabian Gulf, the World After February 28 Will Never Be the Same.

By Samir al-Taqi — Source: An-Nahar

There are moments of transformation in which maps speak more eloquently than munitions. A missile announces an immediate danger, but a map announces a strategy.

The proof: on May 4, 2026, Iran's Revolutionary Guard issued a new map of the Strait of Hormuz, extending Iran's control over its alleged territorial waters out to a limit of 200 kilometers. According to the map, this zone stretches from Qeshm Island all the way to Umm al-Quwain, and from Jabal Mubarak down to Fujairah.

In doing so, Iran is not testing the entire strategic order of the Gulf and the world; rather, it is attempting to test and probe its actual adversaries—and to discover who will confront it regionally and internationally.

Yes, Iran is seeking to redefine the political geography of the Gulf. A Revolutionary Guard officer described Hormuz not as a maritime passage, but as a vast theater of military operations under Iranian sovereignty and within the scope of its operations. The language was bureaucratic; but the implication was revolutionary and doctrinal.

For the Arab Gulf states, this war and this map mark the end of an era of benign neighborliness, and the beginning of an era of redrawing opportunities and risks and forming alliances in the region.

After 1971, the political economy of the Gulf rested on the assumption that the need for energy and the system of international globalization would converge to reduce risks. But in this war, strategic geography returns to cast its shadow. Thus the contradiction is embodied: an Arab Gulf that is globally vital yet geographically threatened!

Iran is now striving assiduously to exploit international and regional chaos: a fragmented world, a less predictable West, and a reckless, failing Iran seeking to spread its ideological darkness across the region—betting on reshaping the strategic psychology of the Hormuz chokepoint through the logic of fear and extortion.

The Ukrainian war made clear radical transformations in the current strategic-military environment, where cheap, rudimentary means of combat threaten enormously expensive deterrence systems.

By contrast, Iran is attempting to entrench ambiguity in its intentions. To achieve this, Tehran does not need to permanently close Hormuz, but rather to threaten navigation so that the global economy becomes hostage to Tehran's goodwill.

In its attempts to besiege the Gulf states, Fujairah has become the most important target of Iranian belligerence, where the pipeline from the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to Fujairah constitutes the vital insurance policy against the Iranian strategy. Fujairah, in turn, becomes a national security asset and a sovereign space for maneuver.

In 1968, Britain withdrew; some believed it a strategic shock from which the Gulf states would never recover and after which none would remain standing. At that point, union was the strategic response, for the Emirates was born not of abundance alone, but of that blend of wisdom and the diversification of the sources of national security.

Now, the strategic imagination of the Emirates and of the other Gulf states will not let this challenge pass—turning it instead into new opportunities to consolidate strength and to build.

The lesson is clear!

Ever since an American-flagged tanker struck an Iranian mine in 1987, and the invasion of Kuwait that followed, it has become evident that the great powers do not eliminate the vital dangers produced by an aggressive Iranian regime. The lesson is that deterrence after the attack is not enough; rather, there must be a resolve that prevents the attack in the first place, for one cannot conflate inevitability with certainty.

The United States is no longer the strategic actor it was in 1991. Rather, it is dismantling the very globalization it created as the foundation of the international order in 1945. A selective, hesitant, and perpetually belated America cannot, on its own, be the pillar of strategic deterrence for the Arabian Gulf.

Tehran understands that the West is unreliable and cannot be counted upon alone to build a sustainable regional order. And while China watches a world full of uncertainty, the dismantling of globalization does not mean, for the Gulf states, the end of interdependence.

It is necessary, but never sufficient. It must be carried by an automatic national deterrence and a regional strategic solidarity.

Yes, it is a dangerous world—especially when you sit upon a strategic artery.

From missiles, to drones, to militias, and then to financial and cyber tools, Iran persists in employing the means of "asymmetric power" in what is called "the salami tactic." It is a tactic that relies on slicing apart the elements of power of adversaries and neighbors and destroying their deterrence, slice after slice, until they are coerced and Iran's regional dominance is entrenched. It invests in the opportunity afforded by the hesitancy of American deterrence and the rationality of markets, to exercise calculated pressure—shrouded in ambiguity, precisely calibrated, and supported by a reversible, exploratory escalation reinforced by negotiating leverage.

Thus the nuclear shadow becomes the most dangerous tool, aimed at excluding the major powers, so that Iran may impose its hegemony under what is called the "Iranian peace," built upon Iranian regional dominance.

In this way, Iran continues to bolster proxy wars and naval, aerial, and cyber thuggery.

In Iran's mind, the nuclear umbrella will allow it to stay the hand of the major powers and to sustain the proxy wars! An unconventional invasion, more tools of deterrence and coercion, wars and gains by proxy—permitting no decisive resolution, but instead reinforcing uncertainty!

It is at once an alarm bell and a strategic opportunity.

For the Ukrainian war revealed characteristics that allow the Arab Gulf states to reproduce a parallel regional strategic security system.

The wars of drones, communications, cyber, and artificial intelligence—and the capacity to innovate rapid means of compensating for losses—must be transformed into a weapon countering the Iranian strategy, one that can substantially reduce the costs of offsetting the failure of the international strategy, making up for shortfalls and strengthening the defensive and deterrent capabilities of the Arab Gulf states.

In this way, wealth becomes a tool for manufacturing resilience, confidence, and decisive deterrence—after Iran intended it to be a strategic trap.

The United Arab Emirates can undoubtedly do this, given its speed of administrative response, its financial depth, and its engagement with the deepest components of the technological revolution, supported by a complex infrastructure and diplomatic flexibility.

These challenges raise, in equal measure, the importance of diversifying Gulf, regional, and international alliances—so as to achieve a minimum of operational air and naval coordination, and to create a local and regional production system.

Ultimately, Gulf deterrence should reinforce Iran's conviction that the cost of its aggressions will be immediate and exceedingly steep. Meanwhile, Asian strategic partnerships constitute an essential option—a structured dialogue that balances energy and security, investment and resilience, naval coordination, and diplomatic pressure against the coercive control of trade routes. For diplomacy becomes feeble with Iran absent a resilience whose dangers Iran clearly recognizes—and absent its recognition of the failure of its coercive adventures.

Between engagement and deterrence: that is the central dialectic of the coming Gulf order—denying Iran the benefits of coercion while preserving the avenues of negotiation. Denial, absorption, transcendence, retaliation, and shaping: that is the nucleus of the coming Gulf strategy.

And while Iran wishes to create a climate of strategic submission across the region, the Gulf states respond by paralyzing Iran's capacity for aggression and dominance.

It is a blend of discipline and resilience; of confidence in one's own capabilities, and of wisdom. Article link https://www.annahar.com/articles/annahar-writers/314055/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-28-%D9%81%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7